U.S. policies towards Haiti have played an important role in the country’s development and political situation. These policies encompass two key spheres: the furnishing and delivery of economic and humanitarian aid, and the promotion of democracy and peace.
U.S. relations with Haiti are defined by a complex history. American policy-makers have considered Haiti to be strategically important since it wrested independence from France in 1804. The United States occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934, a period which saw the Marine Corps garrisoned throughout the country and U.S. control of the Haitian government. The exit of U.S. forces saw a brief period of democracy, which eventually ceded to military control. This in turn was succeeded in 1957 by the corrupt and authoritarian rule of Francois Duvalier, or “Papa Doc” and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, known as “Baby Doc”. Viewing the regime as anti-communist, the United States turned a blind eye to the Duvaliers for most of their time in office.
Having inherited the regime after his father’s death, Baby Doc continued to lead Haiti into decline. Facing widespread discontent and under pressure from the Reagan administration to leave, he fled the country in 1986. He was succeeded by a military dictatorship, which fell in 1990 after the United States curtailed aid. The same year, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former priest, was elected on a reformist platform. Removed in 1991 by the military, he then returned to power by U.S. military intervention in 1994. The political and economic situation in Haiti continued to deteriorate, with Aristide exhibiting many of the authoritarian tendencies of his predecessors. Toppled by a coup in 2004, Aristide departed for South Africa. An international peacekeeping force soon entered, remaining until 2017, but proved unable to restore stability.
Haiti today remains plagued by political corruption, gang violence, and crippling poverty. A catastrophic earthquake in 2010 killed over two hundred thousand people. One in two Haitians today suffer from food insecurity and 60% of Haitians live in poverty. The Haitian government has proved consistently unable to reign in violent criminal gangs. In 2021, Haitian President Jovenel Moise was assassinated - the circumstances of his death are murky, and the transition of power after his death remains controversial.
U.S. policy towards Haiti falls under the auspices of three overarching strategies in the region: The United States - Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act, the Global Fragility Act, and the U.S.-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis. The Strategic Engagement Act seeks to institutionalize “robust and regular engagement between Caribbean leaders and the U.S. government.” Key components of this program include the establishment of a regular conference between leaders in the region and increased U.S. diplomatic presence throughout the Caribbean. The Global Fragility Act emphasizes a long-term investment in diplomatic engagement and peacebuilding in fragile states worldwide, including Haiti. The GFA stresses multilateral engagement throughout government and civil society. After years of failed U.S. and foreign intervention, the GFA provides a potential blueprint for lasting peace and development success in Haiti. Finally, the U.S. - Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis aims to tackle the regional effects of climate change.
These strategies, particularly the GFA, promote innovative approaches to peacebuilding and aid in Haiti. These are vital, as U.S. development programs to Haiti have had, at best, mixed results. Before the 2010 earthquake, U.S. assistance to Haiti totaled hundreds of millions of dollars annually. However, this failed to provide solutions to longstanding governance issues. Examples of poorly executed programs abound. A U.S. program to strengthen the rule of law over a five year span spent $100 million, but had little to show for it, as “the Haitian government’s lack of a clear commitment to addressing the major problems of its police and judicial institutions has been the key factor affecting the success of the U.S. assistance provided to these institutions.” Reforms to strengthen the rule of law ignored that the government responsible for maintaining it proved unwilling to do so. Such a fundamental stumbling block ensured the program failed. Another initiative run by USAID aimed to demilitarize former soldiers, but failed to realize the difficulties of reintegrating them into society. According to a report by the National Academy of Public Administration, “some 5,500 of 6,250 soldiers registered with IOM. Some 5,200 were trained and 4,600 participated in the job service. Around 304, or 6%, obtained a job. Only one officer participated in the program.” It turned out that employers were unwilling to hire those who had been responsible for maintaining the former military regime. The consequences of this failure were severe, as these soldiers later helped overthrow Aristide for the second time. The failure to adapt the program to the broader social dynamics at play lead to further political instability.
Well-intentioned peace-building programs targeted specific issues and governmental departments without realizing that the programs would flounder due to the surrounding civil and political circumstances. As a whole, peacebuilding strategies failed to build civil institutions and establish the reliable governance standards that are essential for political stability and economic growth. Per a World Bank report “failure to give highest priority to resolving the political and governance problems that undermined economic development nullified donor attempts to improve conditions in Haiti.” This inability to address the fundamental issues within Haiti hobbled aid efforts before they began.
On the other hand, U.S. aid programs have been very successful in providing food and life-saving aid to meet urgent needs on the ground. Since the 2010 earthquake, the U.S. has provided more than $5.6 billion in total aid. U.S. programs have increased crop yields for Haitian farmers, given access to clean water for more than 300,000 Haitians, and reduced child mortality rates. Working with the Foreign Service, the Haitian PEPFAR program has ensured that HIV positivity rates remain relatively low at 2%. All of these programs serve essential functions throughout Haiti. However, Haiti’s dependency on foreign aid has led one analyst of the region to dub Haiti an “aid state” - one that is entirely at the mercy of foreign donors. Breaking this dependency and building an independent, free, and prosperous Haiti will require strategically planned and effective development aid. This aid must encompass every sphere of society, from civil society to governance standards.
Some of this work is already being done via the strategic plans applied to Haiti. The Global Fragility Act has provided a ten year strategic blueprint that enables the U.S. to focus on long-term Haitian recovery. Under the broader auspices of the GFA, the U.S. is helping to rebuild the crippled Haitian judiciary, whose Supreme Court consists of 3 of its intended 12 judges. The State Department is also helping implement a case digitization system that will ensure the rebuilt judiciary remains transparent and reduces waiting times. Understanding that effective and honest law enforcement is crucial, the State Department is assisting the Haitian National Police achieve internal accountability via auditing and training. More importantly, this commitment extends beyond individual government departments. The U.S. is working with local municipalities to create investment plans that take into account local stakeholders while emphasizing transparency. Finally, to ensure effective peacebuilding, the U.S. is engaging with the communities most impacted by instability to resolve the underlying issues of violence and internal conflict. These policies follow the strategic guidance laid out by the GFA: consolidated U.S. efforts that engage both government and civil society in tandem. Continuing these efforts is crucial to building Haiti into a state that can stand on its own feet and is not wholly dependent on aid. Balancing the flow of aid with multilateral state-building that emphasizes stakeholder participation aims for Haiti to be well positioned to exit the vicious cycle of violence and instability that has gripped it for decades.
However, it is vital that these development efforts are not shaped, planned, and implemented solely from Washington D.C. Nation building cannot be an artificial exercise executed by outsiders, as demonstrated by the United States’s travails in Afghanistan. Instead, the U.S. should partner with the Montana Accord, a broad-based coalition of civil society groups, and the fragile but internationally recognized government of Prime Minister Ariel Henry, to promote well thought-out approaches to the national tragedies of poverty, violence, and poor governance. Paired with existing programs that seek to empower local communities and organizations, this strategy should help build a Haitian state that bears legitimacy and an inclusive civil society. U.S. policy towards Haiti is crucial in determining its future, but it must empower Haitian citizens, Haitian ideas, and a legitimate Haitian government. To do otherwise would sustain the tragedies of the past.
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