The Russians are coming! Unfortunately, I’m not referring to the 1966 comedy The Russians are Coming, the Russians are Coming, which has aged remarkably well. No, I’m referring to Russian expansionism under Vladimir Putin, an altogether less cheery topic, and one that I believe will receive a large amount of international attention in the next few months. But before going into that, I should provide some necessary context.
Vladimir Putin has ruled Russia since the year 2000. As stated in this Financial Times article, there have been three key stages to Putin’s governing. The first stage oversaw economic growth and prosperity, a revitalization of the country after the dumpster fire that was Russia in the 1990s. In this period, Russian GDP per capita grew nearly thirty percent, bringing widespread popularity to Putin. However, this boom in the economy was largely fueled by Russia’s massive oil and gas industries, which suffered severely after the price of oil tanked in late 2008.
This is where the second stage begins, amid a global economic slowdown. Seeing the economic gains of the last eight years recede, Putin needed to rally the people and ensure that the legitimacy of his regime remained secure. The best way to rally support and inspire patriotic feeling? Launch and win a war. Several wars, in fact. This was interwoven with Putin’s desire to restore Russia to what it once was, to regain the lost territories and influence which vanished after the collapse of the USSR. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, following deteriorating relations with the pro-NATO Georgian president and what the Russians viewed as a threat on their border. Next came Ukraine. In 2014, Russian troops seized control of Crimea, formally annexing it after a “democratic” referendum. At the same time, Russian troops with all insignia removed invaded Eastern Ukraine, supporting pro-Russian separatists in Donbass, one of the eastern provinces of Ukraine. This conflict continues to this day, albeit in somewhat of a stalemate. This also led to stringent sanctions on Russia from the United States, and the widespread realization in the West that the Russians were back. The Russians rolled into Syria the very next year, saving the dictatorship of Bashar-Al Assad from near certain collapse. All of this coincided with a change in Russian tone and foreign policy, which became much more belligerent and malevolent. Geopolitically, the restoration of long-term Russian control over Crimea was a major victory. On the domestic front, Putin’s efforts succeeded, with his approval rating soaring to 88% following the unofficial invasion of Ukraine.
These achievements led to the third stage of Putin’s rule. The popularity boost that Putin acquired as a result of his military adventures abroad could only last so long before people remembered the faltering economy and repressive state under which they lived. Now, Putin’s poll numbers have dropped into the low 60s, and protests and demonstrations against his rule have grown in both strength and intensity. His regime has responded with a brutal crackdown on protesters, their leaders, and civil liberties as a whole. Russia, which was never a free country, has become even more authoritarian.
All of this leads to my main point: Putin is faced with a situation similar to that of 2014. The Russian economy has been stagnant or sliding for the past decade. Protests are widespread and the opposition is planning for a fight at the ballot box this year. Putin’s thirst to retake what he views as properly Russian territory is unquenched. In addition, the new administration in Washington has little interest in getting entangled with the Russians as they seek to pivot to Asia. All of this leads to an opportunity for Putin to reinvigorate his nationalist base and enact his long standing geopolitical goal of regaining the lands lost with the demise of the USSR. Putin needs a victory, something to rally the people around him once again, and an invasion or military intervention would certainly fulfill that goal.
There are several possibilities Putin would consider, although I believe that he will, and has, settled on invading the rest of Eastern Ukraine. The Baltic states have a large Russian population and are coveted by the Russian elite, but unfortunately for Putin, are NATO members. Attacking them would go too far, and Putin is neither stupid nor desperate enough to attempt it. The Central-Asian countries are already under Russia’s sphere of influence. Belarus, although floundering, is an ally, and Putin has no interest in a war with one of their only supporters in the region. This leaves one option: Ukraine. Ukraine’s Eastern provinces are majority Russian, and Putin could easily claim that they are being mistreated and must be liberated. It was done in 2014 and it could be done again, but now on a larger scale. By capturing Eastern Ukraine Putin would regain the lost territories he so desperately desires, while also satisfying his nationalist base by showing that Russia has helped its countrymen and asserted its might. A large concentration of Russian forces would likely steamroll Ukraine’s army and nationalist militias and could easily push to the banks of the Dnieper if they so desired.
A lot in this what-if scenario depends on the reaction of the United States. The Americans committed to defending the territorial integrity of Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, and in return, Ukraine gave up the nuclear weapons left on its soil after the end of the Cold War. That treaty was ignored in 2014. Newly-inaugurated President Joe Biden will be reluctant to commit to Ukraine, as the new administration attempts to focus on Asia, but he will be much more reluctant to let Russia trample through Eastern Ukraine. He saw the results of Barack Obama’s non-action in 2014 and may realize that mere condemnation and sanctions are ineffective. The actions of the new administration will be key and could mean the difference between a massive victory for Putin and an embarrassing withdrawal or non-event. A Ukraine looking to the EU for help will find little forthcoming. Germany’s military is in shambles and its economy is reliant on Russian oil and gas. France and Britain have no interest in a ground conflict in Eastern Europe, especially amid the COVID crisis. If the United States does not help Ukraine, no one will.
Russia always has, and always will, view Eastern Ukraine as rightfully Russian territory. That will not change. What can change is the way the world views that belief and how it is willing to respond. Ukraine is a sovereign nation with its own language, borders, and politics. If these most basic principles are not defended, whether through diplomacy or on the battlefield, the Russian bear will not stop at Ukraine.
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